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Introduction 
In Ariosa v. Sequenom, the Federal Circuit and the district courts 
attempted to draw the line to determine the point at which a diagnostic 
method so transforms a natural principle by human invention that it 
becomes patent-eligible subject matter.1 Section 101 of the United States 
Code states that “whoever invents any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent 
therefore.”2 However, the Supreme Court has long excluded laws of 
nature, abstract ideas, and physical phenomena (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as a “natural principle,” “natural phenomenon,” or “natural 
law”) from patentability under § 101.3 For example, the Supreme Court 
held in Myriad that genomic DNA itself is not patent-eligible because it is a 
natural phenomenon and not the product of human ingenuity, regardless 
of whether it had been isolated from the surrounding DNA by human 
means.4 The issue becomes more complicated, however, when the 
question is directed at diagnostic methods that put natural principles to 
use. Generally, diagnostic methods are processes used to diagnose, 
detect, or determine a course of treatment for a disease.5 Diagnostic 
methods and tests may incorporate natural phenomena in many ways: 
through the use of DNA,6 concentration relationships,7 or schedules for 
determining optimal vaccination times.8 The diagnostic methods at issue 
in Ariosa were directed to a novel use of cell-free fetal DNA (“cffDNA”). 
Prior to the diagnostic method patented in the Ariosa case, cffDNA had 
been discarded by medical professionals in the field as nothing more than 
 
1. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015); 
This Note will use the encompassing term ‘natural principle’ or ‘natural 
phenomena’ to refer collectively to laws of nature, abstract principles, and 
physical phenomena as noted in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. 
2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
3. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978). 
4. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2017, 2116 
(2013). 
5. U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., DIAGNOSTIC TESTS, 
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/diagnostictests.html (last updated Dec. 
22 2015). 
6. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 788 F.3d at 1373; See also Genetic Technologies Ltd. 
v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., 24 F.Supp.3d 922, 928 (N.D.Cal. 2014). 
7. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 
(2012). 
8. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
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waste matter.9 The new diagnostic method used cffDNA to conduct non-
invasive fetal testing.10 
Prior jurisprudence has held that “a process is not unpatentable 
simply because it contains a law of nature.”11 The Supreme Court has 
warned against an overly broad interpretation of these exclusions, 
because all inventions on some level rely on natural principles.12 The Court 
has held that claims directed to a process that encompasses a natural 
principle may be patent eligible when the process is transforming or 
reducing one item to a different state or different item and when there 
are aspects of novelty involved in the invention that go beyond the 
discovery of the natural principle.13 
Though Sequenom—the company that invented the diagnostic 
method at issue in Ariosa—petitioned for its case to be reheard en banc, 
the Federal Circuit denied the petition.14 In his concurrence with the 
denial of Sequenom’s petition, Judge Lourie urged reconsideration of “a 
rule that takes inventions of this nature out of the realm of patent 
eligibility on grounds that they only claim a natural phenomenon plus 
conventional steps, or that they claim abstract concepts.”15 He further 
stated, “it is said that the whole category of diagnostic claims is at risk. It is 
also said that a crisis of patent law and medical innovation may be upon 
us, and there seems to be some truth in that concern.”16 
The primary problem with the patent eligibility of diagnostic methods 
is the lack of clarity in the current patent subject-matter eligibility test 
employed by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) 
and the courts. Particularly, there needs to be clarification regarding 
whether the discovery of a natural law is sufficient to make a combination 
of steps otherwise well known in the field into a patent-eligible method, 
or whether the steps themselves must also be novel contributions. The 
lack of clarity means there is confusion between the USPTO, the district 
courts, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court about which diagnostic 
methods are patent-eligible uses of a natural phenomenon. This confusion 
leads to an excess of litigation—the USPTO grants a patent on a diagnostic 
test, only to have that patent invalidated by the court system when it 
becomes the subject of an infringement suit. A clear test for determining 
 
9. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 788 F.3d at 1373. 
10. See id. 
11. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). 
12. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
13. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185. 
14. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015), 
cert denied (No. 2014-1139) (Lourie, J., concurring). 
15. Id. at 1285. 
16. Id. 
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whether a particular diagnostic method is eligible for patent protection 
would prevent the inconsistency between the standards used by the 
USPTO and the ones used by courts and would give companies certainty 
that their products are either patent protected or not. The current tests 
not only fail to offer guidance in the area of diagnostic tests, but also add 
to the confusion by using language ill-fitting the biotechnology field.17 
Section I of this Note begins by providing a brief overview of what 
diagnostic methods are and whether or not their patent eligibility is a 
worthy goal. The section discusses the rationales behind patent protection 
in general and the arguments for and against the patenting of diagnostic 
methods in particular. 
Section II traces the history of jurisprudence in the area, from 
decisions based solely on whether a claim entirely preempts a natural 
phenomenon, to the current Mayo v. Prometheus Two-Step test. This 
section then summarizes some of the problems with the current tests as 
they stand. Section III is an analysis of Ariosa v. Sequenom and its 
implications for decisions on the patent eligibility of diagnostic tests. The 
section outlines the facts and holding of the case and compares them with 
Genetic Technologies v. Agilent in order to highlight the confusion 
remaining in the field.18 
Section IV explores the idea of importing language from §§ 102 and 
103 of the patent code into the § 101 analysis to serve as a framework for 
the patent-eligibility test. This section outlines the analyses used to 
determine whether a patented invention is novel and non-obvious and 
provides an overview of jurisprudence relating to those determinations. 
Section V suggests a framework for a new patent-eligibility test to be 
applied to claims directed to diagnostic tests. The new test proposes a 
three-step system that begins with an application of the Supreme Court’s 
Mayo Two-Step test, and wherein the language of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 
103 is imported to clarify the meaning of terms as they apply to the 
biotechnology and medical fields. Failing the Mayo Two-Step creates a 
rebuttable presumption of unpatentability that can be overturned by the 
second and third steps of the proposed test. The section ends with an 
application of the newly proposed test to the diagnostic test at issue in 
Ariosa. 
I. What are Diagnostic Methods and Why Patent Them? 
Medical-technique and medical-procedure patenting is a controversial 
area. The Patent Office Board of Appeals has held that methods of 
treatment with varied likelihoods of success are not patentable due to 
 
17. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1296-99 (problems interpreting 
terms such as ‘inventive concept’ and ‘transformation’). 
18. Genetic Tech. Ltd. v. Agilent Tech., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 922, 926-933 (N.D. Cal. 
2014). 
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their uncertainty.19 In general, medical procedures without a sufficiently 
certain result were not granted patent protection for fear that the public 
would equate a patented procedure with one that had a higher likelihood 
of success.20 However, this decision left the door open to patenting for 
procedures that resulted in a sufficiently certain result, such as those used 
to diagnose diseases, rather than treat them.21 
Diagnostic methods, also known as diagnostic tests or simply 
diagnostics, are medical tests that are used to identify a disease and track 
its progression.22 The term can also be used for applications such as 
genetic testing, where medical professionals are not identifying a 
particular disease but rather a series of characteristics, such as sex.23 
There are many reasons why patent protection for diagnostic tests is a 
desirable outcome and also many reasons to proceed with caution in 
establishing an overly inclusive system. 
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101: Patent-eligibility Rationales 
To understand why the decision in Ariosa is, in the words of 
Sequenom, “an existential threat to patent protection for an array of 
meritorious inventions,” one must first look to the underlying rationales 
for allowing patents themselves.24 
1. Rewarding Innovation: Why do we patent? 
Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress 
the power “to promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”25 The law incentivizes 
innovation by rewarding those who make a novel contribution in their art 
with a limited monopoly that brings with it a potential financial profit. 
Patent law encourages inventors to invent and to disclose those 
inventions to the public where they will do the most good. The law seeks 
to ensure that new innovations will reach the public domain, hence the 
 
19. JOANNA T. BROUGHER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES: BALANCING 
INNOVATION AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 68 (2014); See also Ex Parte Brinkerhoff, 27 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 793, 798 (1945). 
20. See BROUGHER, supra note 19, at 68. 
21. Ex parte Kettering, 35 USPQ 342, 343 (P.O.B.A. 1936). 
22. Morgan Medlin, Transformation of Diagnostic Method Patents: Why Changes in 
Biotechnology and the Law Make Evolution Necessary, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 
627, 628 (2014). 
23. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
24. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant for Rehearing En Banc at 1, Ariosa Diagnostics Inc. v. 
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 2014-1139). 
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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written disclosure requirement, the enablement requirements, and the 
limits on patent terms.26 Furthermore, patent law requires that advances 
currently in the public domain remain there, hence the novelty and non-
obviousness requirements codified in §§ 102 and 103.27 
Without the patent system, it is argued, inventors have no external 
motivation to bring the science and progress behind their inventions to 
the public domain and may instead opt to keep them secret in order to 
retain a monopoly over their production and use.28 Instead of disclosing 
their invention via patent specification, inventors would opt to use trade-
secret law. Unlike obtaining a patent, protecting an invention through the 
use of trade-secret law does not require that the inventor disclose 
anything about how their product is made.29 Though the public would still 
have access to the invention itself, the science behind its production 
would remain a secret. This is a great detriment to the public, as it 
prevents others from building off of those innovations to create further 
public benefit. Patent law is a compromise, enticing inventors to share 
their secrets for the promise of a limited monopoly in order to ensure that 
the flow of information, human progress, and innovation is not stemmed. 
In order to receive a patent, inventors must submit a fully detailed 
description of their work, which is then published and available to all.30 
This system ensures that while inventors receive the direct benefit of their 
inventions in terms of capturing the market, the research that they have 
done is available to others as a resource or building block for future 
inventions. Without the promise of a limited monopoly, inventors would 
be more likely to keep the details of their inventions and research secret 
to monopolize the market. 
In particular, the field of diagnostic tests is one in which advances are 
made with great frequency. Patent protection ensures that researchers 
have the motivation and funds to continue their work, while also ensuring 
that the science behind the innovations comes to the public light. 
 
26. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (the written disclosure and enablement 
requirements of subsection (a) require that a patent specification contain a 
description of the invention that is detailed enough so that a person of ordinary 
skill in the area of the invention would be able to make and use the invention); 
See also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (the term of a patent lasts 20 years from the 
date the application was filed); 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(2) (the term of a patent lasts 20 
years from the date the application was filed). 
27. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2012). 
28. Kristen Nugent, Patenting Medical Devices: The Economic Implications of 
Ethically Motivated Reform, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 135, 137 (2008). 
29. Id. at 154, 171. 
30. 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
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2. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter and Undue Preemption 
Despite these rationales—and in some cases, because of these 
rationales—there are still areas where courts have limited patent 
eligibility to prevent certain types of discoveries and inventions from 
receiving patent protection.31 Natural principles and undue preemption 
serve as some of the principles behind these limitations. 
Patent law seeks to ensure that information that is currently in the 
public domain remains there. Section 101, as interpreted by the Court, 
deems natural phenomena, abstract ideas, and products of nature 
unpatentable subject matter under the theory that they already belong to 
the public. They are considered “part of the storehouse of knowledge of 
all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”32 
Accordingly, the courts are loath to allow patents that claim natural 
principles themselves. 
The historical bar on patents claiming natural principles comes from 
the courts’ aversion to undue preemption. Undue preemption occurs 
when a patent either claims a natural principle itself or claims such a 
broad application of the natural principle that there is no way to use the 
natural principle itself without infringing upon the patent.33 Undue 
preemption removes a natural principle from the public domain because 
all other uses of the principle would infringe the preempting patent. For 
example, in Diamond v. Diehr, the invention concerned a machine that 
functioned by using the Arrhenius equation to determine when to open a 
rubber mold so that the rubber would be fully cured.34 Diehr could not 
have patented the Arrhenius equation itself, even had he discovered it, 
because the equation is a natural principle; it merely describes 
mathematically a relationship that exists in nature. However, the Court 
allowed him to patent one particular use of the equation, because it did 
not prevent others from using the equation in a different situation.35 
Some preemption is inherent within the patent system and is, in fact, 
what the system itself is built on, but in the case of undue preemption, the 
detriment to the public good outweighs the benefit to the inventor. 
Diagnostic testing is an area ripe for problems of undue preemption. 
For example, in Mayo v. Prometheus, the claimed method at issue was a 
method for calibrating the dosage of thiopurine drugs in treating 
 
31. Patent Law – Patentable Subject Matter – Federal Circuit Invalidates Diagnostic 
Method Claims as Drawn to “Abstract Mental Processes.” – Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 125 HARVARD L. REV. 658, 663 (2011). 
32. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
33. Dan Hoang, Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo Clinic’s Gift to the Biotech 
Industry: A Study of Patent-Eligibility of Medical Treatment and Diagnostic 
Methods after Bilski, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 457, 469 (2011). 
34. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981). 
35. Id. at 192-3. 
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autoimmune disease.36 The patent claimed the actual correlation between 
the thiopurine-drug dosage and the amount of thiopurine metabolites in 
the body. This is a claim directed at the underlying natural principle itself, 
not a claim directed at an application of that principle. Claiming the 
underlying natural law, rather than a specific application of it, preempts 
any other uses of that natural law without first licensing the patent that 
claimed it. In Mayo, allowing a patent on the correlation between 
thiopurine drugs and the metabolites they create in the body would stop 
anyone else from using that correlation for diagnostic or research 
reasons.37 Preemption of that magnitude would stifle the free flow of 
information that is necessary for the continuing advancement of the 
sciences. 
B. Arguments Against Patentability 
One of the main arguments against granting patents to diagnostic 
tests is the effect on the public’s access to medical treatment.38 Patents 
raise the costs of diagnostic tests because they create market exclusivity, 
allowing companies to charge whatever they would like due to the lack of 
competition.39 Companies then pass on the increased costs to the medical 
industry and, by extension, to the consumers themselves. Higher prices 
mean that some consumers will be unable to afford necessary diagnostic 
treatments. Lack of patent protection would allow for a competitive 
market, which has the potential to lower prices, increasing access for 
consumers who need diagnostic treatments. 
Another strong argument raised against patent protection for 
diagnostic tests is that they may in some ways restrict access to 
information.40 In other ways, as discussed in Section I.A, patent protection 
may also aid in the disclosure of information. Many types of research build 
on the foundation of preceding tests and discoveries that came before. 
Over-patenting or overbroad patents themselves can create a thicket of 
licensing issues that exponentially raise the cost and difficulty of research. 
If claims directed at a diagnostic test are overly broad, they may preempt 
all other uses of the natural phenomenon on which the diagnostic test 
relies. 
Furthermore, there is a public-health concern that allowing the 
patenting of diagnostic treatments will open the door to patent-
infringement suits against doctors.41 Because patents on diagnostic tests  
36. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1290 
(2012). 
37. Id. at 1294. 
38. BROUGHER, supra note 19, at 87. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 88. 
41. Id. at 88-9. 
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often claim a method for using the test itself, a doctor who utilizes a 
particular test to diagnose a patient may find herself suddenly being sued 
for patent infringement. Furthermore, doctors or medical practices 
unwilling or unable to afford licensing fees for particular tests may 
disadvantage their patients by using outdated or less-effective diagnostic 
tests instead of the more-effective patented ones. Any efforts to create a 
test that clearly defines the patent eligibility of diagnostic methods must 
account for these concerns. 
II. Patents Claiming Applications of Natural Phenomena: The Thicket 
of Prior Jurisprudence 
As with any legally and scientifically complicated area, the 
jurisprudence surrounding the patent eligibility of diagnostic tests is a 
quagmire. The differing decisions in recent, similarly situated cases such as 
Ariosa and Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. highlight 
the differences in opinions regarding the patentability of diagnostic tests 
between the USPTO, the district courts, the Federal Circuit, and the 
Supreme Court.42 Throughout the years, courts have attempted many 
iterations of a test for patent eligibility of processes applying natural 
phenomena and will likely continue to renew and refine such tests as the 
area continues to expand. 
A. Preemption is Not the Sole Basis for Ineligibility 
In 1978, the Supreme Court limited the patent-eligibility of claims 
directed towards an application of a natural principle. In reversing a 
Federal Circuit decision, the Supreme Court held that the use of an 
algorithm that did not preempt all other uses of that algorithm was a 
patent-eligible process under Gottschalk v. Benson.43 The Court held that 
whether the patent claim would prevent any other use of the natural 
phenomenon is not the only test for patent eligibility. Instead, the Court 
found the claims ineligible because their only novel feature was the 
natural principle itself (an abstract idea—namely, a mathematical 
algorithm for converting binary-coded numerals into pure binary). The 
Court also stated that “conventional post-solution activity” does not 
render the process patentable because a wily inventor could easily add 
some form of post-solution activity to any algorithm.44 Conventional post-
solution activity is any step already known in the field added to the 
process afterward to distinguish it. Adding these kinds of steps to a claim 
 
42. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 
2015); See also Genetic Tech. Ltd. v. Agilent Tech., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 922 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014). 
43. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587-8 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 64, 72 
(1972). 
44. Parker, 437 U.S. at 589-90. 
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on a natural phenomenon is not sufficient to render that claim patent 
eligible. For example, “the Pythagorean theorem would not have been 
patentable . . . because a patent application contained a final step 
indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to 
existing surveying techniques.”45 However, the Court gave no definition of 
“conventional post-solution activity” and added that a process is clearly 
not patent-ineligible merely because it applies a natural principle.46 
B. The Machine or Transformation Test 
In 1981, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of patent eligibility of 
applications of natural principles in Diamond v. Diehr, finding that though 
the claimed process was an application of an algorithm, it was patent 
eligible because it was a specific use of that algorithm specifically tied to a 
machine designed for that use.47 In determining the eligibility of the 
claims, the Court determined that when claims apply a natural principle in 
the context of a structure or process that, when viewed in totality, is 
“performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect 
(e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing),” 
then that process is patent eligible under § 101.48 This test became known 
as the “machine or transformation test.” 
In 2010, the Supreme Court revisited the “machine or transformation 
test” and held that it was not the sole factor in determining patentability 
of a process claiming application of a natural principle.49 In Bilski v. 
Kappos, the Supreme Court held that though the Federal Circuit had 
reached the correct result and invalidated the patent, they had incorrectly 
applied the machine or transformation test as the sole test for patent-
eligibility.50 The patent at issue in Bilski sought to claim “both the concept 
of hedging risk and the application of that concept to energy markets.”51 
This natural principle is an abstract idea, a mathematical formula that 
describes the well-known concept of hedging risk, such as by use of hedge 
funds. The inventors argued that because the hedging formula was 
designed for use by a computer, it was tied to a specific machine and thus 
patent eligible under the machine or transformation test. The Court held 
that though being tied to a specific machine or transformation of an 
article is a clue that a process is patentable, there is nothing in the 
definition of process that explicitly requires that a process be related to a 
 
45. Id. at 590. 
46. Id. 
47. Diamond v. Diehr, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (1981). 
48. Id. 
49. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). 
50. See id. at 3231. 
51. Id. at 3229. 
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machine or transformation in order to be patentable.52 The process in 
Bilski was patent ineligible, not because it lacked ties to a specific machine 
or transformation, but rather because it was directed at an unpatentable 
abstract idea, the concept of risk hedging itself, and the mathematical 
formula describing that concept.53 
Patent claims directed to processes that are not directly linked to a 
machine or transformation of an article are not per se ineligible. Further 
examination must be undertaken to see whether, firstly, the claimed 
process is considered a process under § 101 and secondly, whether the 
process is claiming patent-ineligible subject matter.54 In Bilski, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding that the claimed 
process was in fact claiming a natural principle but gave no exact guidance 
as to how it reached the conclusion that the claimed process did not 
qualify as a process under § 101.55 Instead, the Court stated that it “need 
not define further what constitutes a patentable ‘process,’ beyond 
pointing to the definition of that term provided in § 100(b)56 and looking 
to the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.”57 
C. The Mayo Two-Step 
As questions of patent eligibility continued to arise, the Supreme 
Court realized that it was necessary to provide further guidance on the 
matter of whether claims were a patent-eligible application of a natural 
principle or whether they were claiming the underlying natural 
phenomenon itself and thus not patentable. In Mayo Collaborative 
Services, Inc. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme Court again 
refined its test for patent eligibility, condensing it into a two-step test that 
has become known as the “Mayo Two-Step.” The first step is a 
determination of whether the claims at issue are directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter, such as a natural phenomenon, abstract idea, or 
product of nature.58 If the answer is no, the invention is presumed to be 
patent eligible under § 101. If the answer to the first question is yes, the 
second question is whether the elements of the claim contain an inventive 
concept that sufficiently transforms the natural principle into patent-
 
52. Id. at 3226-27. 
53. Id. at 3231. 
54. See id. at 3229-3230. 
55. Id. at 3230. 
56. 35 U.S.C § 100(b) (2012) (“The term “process” means process, art, or method, 
and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition 
of matter, or material”). 
57. Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3231. 
58. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (applying the 
first step of the Mayo framework). 
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eligible material.59 In other words, the question is whether the invention 
or process is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”60 The 
question remains as to what constitutes an “inventive concept” that 
“sufficiently transforms” the natural phenomena into “significantly more.” 
The Court gave some limited guidance on the issue by stating that in order 
to be a patent-eligible application, the transformation must be more than 
simply stating the natural principle and saying “apply it.”61 
Currently, the Mayo Two-Step is the test used for analyzing patent 
claims directed at diagnostic tests. However, as shown in their recent 
concurrences with the Federal Circuit’s denial of Sequenom’s petition for 
rehearing en banc, both Judge Lourie and Judge Dyk take issue with the 
Mayo Two-Step as far as its application to diagnostic tests is concerned.62 
Judge Lourie writes that though the claims in Ariosa recite novel and 
creative uses of a natural phenomenon, rather than claiming the 
phenomenon itself, “applying Mayo, we are unfortunately obliged to 
divorce the additional steps from the asserted natural phenomenon to 
arrive at a conclusion that they add nothing innovative to the process.”63 
Judge Dyk, agreeing with Judge Lourie’s opinion, stated that he 
share[s] the concerns of some of [his] colleagues that a too 
restrictive test for patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with 
respect to laws of nature (reflected in some of the language in 
Mayo) may discourage development and disclosure of new 
diagnostic and therapeutic methods in the life sciences, which are 
often driven by discovery of new natural laws and phenomena.64 
Though they believe that the language of the test is clear enough, 
neither Federal Circuit judge agrees that the Mayo test is the correct 
standard for use in the realms of diagnostic tests and the medical field. 
Judge Dyk further adds that he thinks the time has come for the Supreme 
Court to issue additional guidance on the matter.65 
D. The Ultramercial Factors 
The Supreme Court specifically mentions that, had it upheld the 
claims in Mayo, it would have risked “disproportionately tying up the use 
 
59. Id. at 2357 (applying the second step of the Mayo framework). 
60. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). 
61. Id. 
62. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1285-1287 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
63. Id. at 1286. 
64. Id. at 1287 (Dyk, J., concurring). 
65. Id. at 1293. 
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of their underlying natural laws.”66 This language essentially describes the 
preemption test that was the Court’s original test for patent eligibility. The 
Court seems to be including preemption as a factor in its Mayo Two-Step, 
though it does not explicitly designate it as one. Its continual usage of the 
language of preemption, even without specifically designating preemption 
as a factor, reinforces the importance of preemption in the patentability 
analysis. 
 In its first decision on Ultramercial, wherein Ultramercial claimed a 
method for distributing products over the Internet using a facilitator, the 
Federal Circuit listed preemption among the factors to be used in 
determining whether a claim is meaningfully limited, therefore turning the 
natural principle into “significantly more.”67 Interestingly, in the second 
Ultramercial opinion (“Ultramercial II”), wherein the Federal Circuit retried 
the case after the Supreme Court vacated the holding, preemption is no 
longer designated a factor for consideration.68 
Ultramercial II outlines several considerations to take into account 
when performing the Mayo Two-Step test.69 After determining under the 
first Mayo step that a claimed process is directed to a patent-ineligible 
concept, one must then determine whether the limitations of the claims 
are sufficient to transform the natural principle into “significantly more” 
than a patent on only the natural principle.70 The court in Ultramercial 
opined that in order to “sufficiently transform,” the claims must constitute 
more than adding routine additional steps specified at a high level of 
generality.71 Steps that are stated generally, such as “gather data,” do not 
add anything novel to the process, particularly because there is no defined 
method that a user must implement to gather the data. The court also 
cited Bilski, stating that restricting claims to a particular technological 
environment is not a sufficient transformation.72 The court then applied 
the machine or transformation test as a third factor.73 
As discussed, the 2014 Ultramercial opinion eliminates the idea of 
preemption as a consideration in the patent-eligibility analysis. This seems 
to be an odd choice in light of other opinions, which have repeatedly 
 
66. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S.Ct. at 1294. 
67. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1345-1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013), 
vacated, 134 S.Ct. 2870, remanded, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
68. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 713-714 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
69. Id. at 715. 
70. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S.Ct. at 1294. 
71. Ultramercial Inc., 772 F.3d at 716. 
72. Id. 
73. See id. at 716-717. 
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stated that preventing preemption of natural principles is a key purpose of 
§ 101 principles.74 
E. The Problem of Diehr 
Further adding to the confusion is the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Diamond v. Diehr, which, despite its continued status as good law, seems 
to defy logic in the face of the Court’s current tests. In Diehr, the Court 
held that the claimed process, which used the Arrhenius equation (a 
mathematical representation of a natural principle—the temperature 
dependence of certain reaction rates) to cure rubber, was a patent-eligible 
application of the equation because it was tied to a specific machine or 
process and did not claim the equation itself.75 
There is no mention in the opinion of whether the steps in the process 
were novel outside of their application to the newly discovered 
equation.76 The Mayo opinion attempts to reconcile this difficulty by 
saying that the process in Diehr was patentable “because of the way the 
additional steps of the process integrated the equation into the process as 
a whole.”77 The Court then distinguishes Diehr from Flook by saying that in 
Flook, the invention preempted all other uses of the natural principle and 
the other steps in the process were conventional.78 This reasoning implies 
that the steps in Diehr must have been something other than well-known 
in the rubber-curing field. This is untrue, as the rubber-curing industry 
already knew that the Arrhenius equation could be used to model the cure 
time the rubber press needed.79 The problem was that using the equation 
required constant recalculation, which was both difficult and time-
consuming. Diehr’s invention solved that problem by using a computer to 
continuously measure the temperature inside the press and feed those 
temperatures into the equation, continuously recalculating the curing 
time.80 
In Alice v. CLS Bank, the Court interpreted Diehr differently, stating 
that the claims in Diehr were eligible because they improved a process 
that was already known in the art by applying the Arrhenius equation81 
 
74. See Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo Collaborative, 628 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (stating that preemption was a rationale behind the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Bilski, Benson, Flook, and Diehr). 
75. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192-93; KEITH J. LAIDLER, CHEMICAL KINETICS 39 (3rd 
ed. 1987). 
76. See Diamond, 450 U.S. at 191. 
77. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012). 
78. Id. at 1299. 
79. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 177-79. 
80. Id. 
81. Alice Corp. Prop. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014). 
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These differing interpretations of the rationale for patent eligibility in 
Diehr directly apply to the problem of determining the patentability of 
diagnostic methods. 
If the characterization in Mayo is correct, then the main inquiry in the 
analysis of whether a diagnostic test is patentable is whether the 
additional steps of the process are in and of themselves novel 
contributions to the field of the invention. This limits patent eligibility for 
diagnostic tests to those tests that discover and create an entirely new 
method of use for a natural principle. If the characterization of Diehr in 
Alice is correct, the inquiry is whether the application of the natural 
principle to conventional steps in the art improves the process as a whole. 
This would allow those diagnostic tests that discover a new natural 
principle and apply that principle in a specific use, regardless of whether 
the steps of that use were conventionally known, to be patent eligible. 
This much-broader inquiry seems to align more with the rationales of the 
patent system in its entirety. In no other section in the patent code is 
there a requirement such as the one characterized by Mayo’s treatment 
of Diehr. As discussed in Section IV, other sections of the patent code 
allow inventions that are a newly ordered combination of steps that are 
already fully known in the art to be considered novel.82 
III. The Ariosa Decision 
A. Factual Background 
The claims in Ariosa v. Sequenom are directed to an application of cell-
free fetal DNA (cffDNA) that uses the cffDNA for non-invasive fetal testing. 
Cell-free fetal DNA is a natural phenomenon that occurs during pregnancy 
wherein DNA from the fetus sheds into the mother’s bloodstream.83 
Sequenom’s first patent claim is directed to 
a method for detecting a paternally inherited nucleic acid of fetal 
origin performed on a maternal serum or plasma sample from a 
pregnant female, which method comprises amplifying a paternally 
inherited nucleic acid from the serum or plasma sample and 
detecting the presence of a paternally inherited nucleic acid of fetal 
origin in the sample.84 
The other two independent claims contain additional or substituted 
steps, such as removing all nucleated or anucleated cells from the blood 
 
82. See Infra Part IV. 
83. See E.S. Lo et al., Transfer of Nucleated Maternal Cells into Fetal Circulation 
During the Second Trimester of Pregnancy, 100 BRIT. J. HAEMATOLOGY 605 (1998). 
84. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 3d 938, 941 (N.D. Cal. 
2013), aff’d, 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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sample85 or obtaining a non-cellular fraction of the blood sample.86 All 
three independent claims stem from the discovery by two of the inventors 
that cffDNA is present in maternal serum and plasma and that it can be 
used for non-invasive fetal testing, which was not previously known. 
Prior to Sequenom’s invention, medical professionals were limited to 
more invasive prenatal diagnostic methods, such as amniocentesis or 
villus sampling.87 These types of invasive tests carry a variety of risks: 
miscarriage, leaking amniotic fluid, needle injury to the fetus, Rh 
sensitization, and infection or infection transmission.88 The test developed 
by Sequenom, marketed under the name Maternit21,89 allows non-
invasive testing to determine such things as sex and blood type and to 
diagnose fetal abnormalities, and pre-eclampsia in the mother.90 The test 
only requires a maternal blood sample.91 
The district court found that the use of the natural principle, the 
cffDNA, was the only inventive concept in the claims, so the claims were 
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter and the patent was thusly 
invalid. The district court also held that Sequenom’s patent was an 
attempt to preempt all other uses of the natural principle because the 
articles cited by Sequenom detailing other methods for detecting cffDNA, 
not limited to the methods disclosed in the patent, had been published 
after the issuance of Sequenom’s patent.92 
B. The Federal Circuit’s Decision 
The Federal Circuit applied the Mayo Two-Step framework in its 
analysis of Sequenom’s claims. Finding first that the claims were directed 
to a natural principle, the court then began an examination of whether the 
steps of the claim contained a sufficient inventive concept to transform 
the natural principle into patent-eligible subject matter. The court held 
that the steps of amplifying the cffDNA (duplicating or creating identical 
DNA until there is a sufficient amount to detect) and detecting the cffDNA 
 
85. Id. at 942. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 941. 
88. See MAYO CLINIC, RISKS OF AMNIOCENTESIS (2015); MAYO CLINIC, RISKS OF CHORIONIC VILLUS 
SAMPLING (2015). 
89. Maternit21, SEQUENOM LABORATORIES (2015), available at 
https://laboratories.sequenom.com/providers/maternit21-
plus/?gclid=CIuokvXS8sgCFQ6maQodwyMKBA. 
90. See Ariosa Diagnostics Inc., 19 F.Supp.3d at 941. 
91. See MaterniT 21, supra note 89. 
92. See Ariosa Diagnostics Inc., 19 F.Supp.3d at 954 (“[E]ven assuming that the 
articles disclose alternative methods of detecting cffDNA, Sequenom has failed 
to show that any alternative methods existed at the time of the invention or at 
the time of issuance of the patent.” (emphasis added)). 
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fragments were not inventive steps that sufficiently transformed the 
natural principle in order to make it patent-eligible.93 The steps were not 
inventive or transformative because steps to amplify and detect DNA were 
already well-known in the field of medicine and Sequenom’s only addition 
was the application of the steps to the newly discovered cffDNA. 
The Federal Circuit mentioned, but failed to fully address, the issue of 
preemption, stating that “in this case, Sequenom’s attempt to limit the 
breadth of the claims by showing alternative uses of cffDNA outside the 
scope of the claims does not change the conclusion that the claims are 
directed to patent ineligible subject matter.”94 The court never addressed 
whether Sequenom’s demonstration of alternative cffDNA uses was 
sufficient to show that the natural phenomena is not preempted by its 
claims. 
C. Comparison with the Genetic Technologies Decision 
In contrast to the decision in Ariosa, in Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. 
Agilent Technologies, Inc., the Northern District of California found that 
amplification of genomic DNA was not an insignificant step because it was 
meaningfully limited under the Ultramercial factors.95 The Genetic 
Technologies decision is interesting because its factual similarity to Ariosa 
highlights the problem areas in the field of patent-eligibility. 
The technology in both cases is directed to a natural principle that 
others in the scientific community felt was unimportant. As discussed in 
Section IV(b) below, industry skepticism in regard to a proposed invention 
is a consideration to be taken into account when determining whether an 
invention may have been obvious under § 103.96 In Genetic Technologies, 
the natural principle was that the non-coding regions of a DNA strand 
(introns) may be linked to the presence of certain alleles in the coding 
portions (exons).97 The claims at issue were directed at a process for 
amplifying and analyzing the intron portions of the DNA strand to see 
what alleles presented in the exon DNA portions.98 Applying the Federal 
Circuit’s factors in Ultramercial to the Mayo Two-Step, the district court 
held that the addition of the amplification and analysis steps were an 
inventive concept that effectively transformed the natural principle into 
more than a claim to the natural principle itself.99 This stands in contrast 
 
93. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
94. Id. at 1379. 
95. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
96. See infra Part IV.B. 
97. Genetic Tech. Ltd. v. Agilent Tech., Inc., 24 F.Supp.3d 922, 926 (N.D.Cal. 2014). 
98. See id. 
99. Id. at 930; See Ultramercial, Inc., 722 F.3d at 1348. 
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to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Ariosa, where the steps of amplification 
and analysis did not sufficiently transform the natural principle using the 
Mayo Two-Step test.100 The court in Genetic Technologies distinguishes its 
decision from Ariosa by stating that the amplification step in the case is 
limited to a specific manner of amplification using a primer pair that spans 
a non-coding sequence.101 If this is the case, and the only thing 
invalidating Sequenom’s patent in Ariosa is that it did not designate a 
method by which the amplification should take place, then the 
requirement of claiming a specific method should be clearly established so 
that it may be taken into account during patent prosecution and 
subsequent examination by the USPTO. 
There is still a need for the courts to decide whether to integrate the 
Ultramercial factors with the Mayo Two-Step test. Without a unified 
guiding standard, the patent-eligibility of diagnostic methods will remain a 
mystery to patent applicants, the USPTO, and the courts. 
IV. The Patent Code as a Whole: Examining § 101 in Light of the 
Other Sections 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Mayo states that too much reliance 
on later sections of the patent code may render § 101 superfluous. 
However, the Supreme Court “recognize[s] that, in evaluating the 
significance of additional steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, 
say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap.”102 There may 
indeed be value in importing language from holdings in the §§ 102 and 
103 areas of law to help decode the language of the § 101 inquiry. For 
example, the terms “inventive concept,” “process,” and “transformation” 
have all been used and defined in the jurisprudence surrounding §§ 102 
and 103. 
These definitions should be considered in order to aid the § 101 
inquiry of patent eligibility, especially in the case of terms that are used in 
multiple sections, such as “inventive concept,” “process,” and 
“transformation.” 
A. § 102: Anticipation, the Inventive Step, and Transformation 
Under the Mayo Two-Step test, in order to be patent eligible, claims 
directed to applications of natural principles must include an “inventive 
step” that “sufficiently transforms” the natural principle into patent-
eligible subject matter.103 Under this test, new combinations of steps that 
 
100. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
101. See Genetic Tech. Ltd., 24 F.Supp.3d at 932. 
102. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012). 
103. Id. at 1294. 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
A Crisis of Patent Law and Medical Innovation: The Category of Diagnostic Claims 
in the Wake of Ariosa v. Sequenom   
453 
were previously known in the art are not patent-eligible when they are 
directed at a natural principle. For this reason, the Federal Circuit rejected 
the claims in Ariosa, because adding the steps of amplification and 
detection to the natural principle of cffDNA was not considered to be an 
inventive step that transformed the cffDNA into eligible matter. This 
analysis differs from the jurisprudence that exists regarding § 102 novelty 
and § 103 non-obviousness. 
Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, in order to patent a device, method, or 
process, it must not only be directed to patent-eligible subject matter, but 
it must also be novel.104 In the field of patent law, practitioners say that an 
invention was not “anticipated” by the prior art.105 For an invention to lack 
novelty, a single prior-art reference must disclose every element or 
limitation of that invention.106 This means that every aspect of an 
invention must be described in one piece of prior art, like a single patent 
or research paper. The USPTO cannot combine two prior inventions to 
render the inventor’s patented invention ineligible.107 The single reference 
requirement is important because it demonstrates the Court’s belief that 
combining previously known steps is in and of itself an inventive step.108 If 
creating a combination of known art was not considered inventive, then 
there would be no reason to specify that all elements and limitations must 
be disclosed in a single prior reference; combinations of references would 
be allowed to disprove novelty. 
If the court had imported this language to the analysis of § 101 to help 
determine whether an inventive step occurred, the claims in Ariosa may 
well have been allowed. The combination of the steps—amplifying the 
cffDNA and detecting the cffDNA—had not been disclosed previously by 
any other reference, because cffDNA was a newly discovered 
phenomenon. 
 
104. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (2012). 
105. See CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 264 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 4th ed. 
2017). 
106. Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999); See NARD, 
supra note 105, at 42 (“Prior art is knowledge—for example patents and 
publications—accessible to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the date of 
invention (pre-AIA timeframe) or before the effective filing date (post-AIA 
timeframe)”). 
107. See U.S. PATENT & TRADE OFFICE, 2141 Examination Guidelines for Determining 
Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103 [R-07.2015], Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure (9th ed., 2015), available at: 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2141.html. 
108. See U.S. PATENT & TRADE OFFICE, 2143 Examples of Basic Requirements of a Prima 
Facie Case of Obviousness [R-08.2012], Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
(9th ed., 2015), available at 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2143.html. 
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B. § 103: Non-Obviousness, Secondary Considerations, and the PHOSITA 
Like the determination of patent eligibility under §101, the inquiry of 
non-obviousness also requires that there be an inventive step or 
transformation that would not have been obvious to a person of ordinary 
skill in the invention’s field.109 In Graham v. John Deere, the Supreme 
Court outlined several factors that must be used in order to establish a 
prima facie case of obviousness.110 However, a prima facie case of 
obviousness may be rebutted through the use of secondary 
considerations. Generally, secondary considerations include such factors 
as (1) whether the invention has been a commercial success, (2) whether 
there has been industry praise and unexpected results, (3) whether other 
companies or inventors have copied the invention, (4) whether before the 
invention there had been industry skepticism with respect to the idea, (5) 
whether customers and competitors were willing to license for the use of 
the inventions, and (6) whether the invention addressed some long-felt 
but unresolved need in the field of the invention.111 
There is value in applying these secondary considerations to the 
inquiry of patent-eligibility as well. Patent law seeks to reward those who 
bring novel and necessary innovation into the public domain. Secondary 
considerations are, in many ways, a measure of how much the public 
benefits from an invention. Large benefit to the public is a clue that an 
invention contains an inventive concept, because if it were not inventive, 
why would companies be willing to license it? Why would consumers be 
willing to purchase it? Why would others in the field not have discovered 
it already? 
There may also be a patent-eligibility benefit in determining who is 
the person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) for the field of art in 
which the invention is situated.112 Patent law places great value on 
examining a patent from the viewpoint of a typical practitioner.113 Would 
a typical PHOSITA have believed that the invention was patent eligible? 
The PHOSITA serves as a measure of the general state of mind of those in 
the field regarding the invention. Due to the lack of clarity in the field of 
patent eligibility, this factor may be harder to use effectively, but there is 
still value in determining whether the average person in the art would 
believe that the claimed invention is patent eligible. If the typical PHOSITA 
 
109. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
110. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1966). 
111. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 
699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
112. See NARD, supra note 105. 
113. See 2107 Guidelines for Examination of Applications for Compliance with the 
Utility Requirement[R:11.2013], U.S. PATENT & TRADE OFFICE, available at 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2107.html (last modified Nov. 
4, 2015). 
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would not believe the claimed process is eligible, then that would be a 
factor against eligibility. 
A court determines the PHOSITA using the relevant factors laid out in 
Daiichi v. Apotex: (1) the education level of the inventor, (2) the typical 
types of problems in the field and who works on those problems, (3) the 
inventors of any prior-art solutions to problems in the field, (4) how 
rapidly advancements in the field are developed, (5) the technology’s 
sophistication, and most importantly (6) the average education level of 
active workers in the field of the art.114 
In the field of diagnostic tests, the PHOSITA is typically a doctor, 
particularly those who specialize in the application of diagnostics, though 
the inventor of a diagnostic test is more likely to be a medical researcher 
or other academic. This distinction can be valuable when determining 
patentability. Would a typical doctor in the field of diagnostics find the 
claimed invention to be something new and non-obvious and thus 
deserving of a patent? 
V. A Proposed Test for Patent-Eligibility of Diagnostic Methods 
A. A Summary of the Current Problems with the Test for Patentability 
As it stands, the Supreme Court in Mayo held that for an application 
of a natural principle—i.e., a diagnostic test—to be patent eligible, the 
inventive concept that transforms the natural principle must be more than 
an application of routine or conventional steps in the medical field. This 
conflicts with earlier language in the opinion wherein the Court directly 
quoted Diehr stating that “the application of a law of nature or 
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be 
deserving of patent protection”.115 These conflicting statements make it 
difficult to determine when the application of a natural principle to a 
known process creates a patent eligible claim. 
Section 100 of the America Invents Act (“Act”) defines terms used in 
the context of the patent statutes.116 However, there are still clarifications 
for the court system to make regarding these terms. For example, the Act 
defines the term “process” as including a new use of a known process or 
composition of matter.117 It is unclear whether this definition would 
extend to patents that claim the application of a known process to a newly 
discovered natural phenomenon, such as the patent at issue in Ariosa.118  
114. Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
115. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293-94 
(2012) (emphasis added). 
116. See 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2012). 
117. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b). 
118. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
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Under the language of § 100(b), Ariosa would appear to be a new use of a 
known process (applying the known process of amplifying and detecting 
DNA to the newly discovered natural phenomenon of cffDNA fragments), 
which, under the Supreme Court’s language in Bilski, would establish 
strong evidence that the claimed process is patent eligible.119 Despite 
attempted clarification, the vagueness of language such as “inventive 
concept” and “sufficiently transforms” leave a test that is not as clear as it 
could be. As Judge Dyk noted in his concurrence with the denial of 
Sequenom’s petition for rehearing en banc, “there is a problem with Mayo 
insofar as it concludes that inventive concept cannot come from 
discovering something new in nature—e.g., identification of a previously 
unknown natural relationship or property.”120 Diagnostic tests that rely on 
newly discovered laws of nature may be ill-suited to a patent-eligibility 
analysis that uses the Mayo test. The field needs a clear test for whether a 
diagnostic test that has its basis in a law of nature is patent eligible. To 
that end, I discuss suggested solutions and propose a novel test for patent 
eligibility of diagnostic methods. 
B.  Two Alternate Solutions 
Some academics suggest alternate solutions for clarifying the area of 
diagnostic methods. The two main solutions proposed as alternatives to 
reshaping the Mayo Two-step are (1) amending § 101, and (2) creating a 
separate section of the United States Code applicable only to patents on 
diagnostic methods similar to section § 161, which applies to plant 
patents.121 
In response to a slew of patent invalidations that followed in the wake 
of the Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank decision, attorney Robert Sachs detailed 
a series of proposed changes to § 101.122 His proposed changes include 
definitional changes that would fall in line with how many scientists 
interpret language surrounding natural phenomena and abstract ideas. 
Further solutions offered, some of which have already been discussed 
earlier in this Note, include adding a safe harbor section that creates a 
presumption of eligibility, determining eligibility based on a PHOSITA’s 
viewpoint, and returning to a test of eligibility on the basis of non-
preemption.123  
119. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3222 (2010) (stating that the Court doesn’t 
need to define a patent-eligible process beyond guiding people to § 100(b)). 
120. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(Dyk, J., concurring). 
121. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2012). 
122. See Robert R. Sachs, Twenty-Two Ways Congress Can Save Section 101, FENWICK & 
WEST BILSKI BLOG (Feb.12, 2015), 
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/02/twenty-two-ways-congress-can-save-
section-101.html. 
123. See id. 
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Another suggested alternative is creating an entirely new statute that 
deals specifically with patenting inventions in the medical field. In 1930, 
Congress created a new statute dealing specifically with human-designed 
varieties of plants. This statute, 35 U.S.C. Chapter 15 §§ 161-164, has its 
own set of requirements distinct from those outlined for typical 
patents.124 A statute created specifically for patents in the medical field 
could likewise have distinct requirements. 
The resistance to these alternatives is often practical, rather than 
intellectual. They would almost certainly work, but why go through the 
arduous task of amending 101 or creating an entirely new statutory 
section to specifically encompass diagnostic tests when there is nothing in 
the original § 101 that excludes them? Diagnostic tests were excluded on 
the basis of jurisprudence, and by jurisprudence they are most effectively 
reinstated. Furthermore, the area of § 101 eligibility could use clarification 
as a whole, not merely in the medical field or the field of diagnostic tests 
in particular. Amending the statute or creating an entirely new statute 
may fix one problem area, but when new ones arise, a new test that 
makes certain the framework for patent eligibility is a solution that can be 
applied over numerous fields. 
C. The Proposed Test 
To provide much-needed clarity, there are several factors that should 
be taken into account in determining the patent eligibility of a diagnostic 
test. No one factor should be dispositive of patentability, but rather their 
impact should be balanced in order to reach a reasoned conclusion on 
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
The first step in determining the patent eligibility of a diagnostic test is 
to apply the Supreme Court’s Mayo test.125 However, the application 
should be done using the interpretations of the “process,” “inventive 
step,” and “transformation” language imported from the jurisprudence 
surrounding sections § 102 and § 103, as discussed in Section IV above.126 
This means that the application of conventional steps to a newly 
discovered natural phenomenon should be considered an “inventive 
step,” just as it would be under the § 102 analysis. If the claims at issue fail 
the application of the Mayo Two-Step, they are presumed to be patent-
ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, that presumption may be 
rebutted using steps two and three, as outlined below. 
The second step in determining the diagnostic method’s patentability 
is to determine whether the claimed method is sufficiently narrow in 
scope and whether it has been reduced to practice. Reduction to practice 
 
124. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2012). 
125. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294-97 
(2012). 
126. See supra Part IV. 
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typically requires “the inventor to prove that the claimed invention works 
for its intended purpose, which typically involves the inventor constructing 
and testing a prototype of the invention.”127 In his concurrence with 
Sequenom’s denial for rehearing en banc, Judge Dyk reiterates that undue 
preemption is the main fear behind allowing a patent on a law of nature. 
For that reason, Judge Dyk stated that “if the breadth of the claim is 
sufficiently limited to a specific application of the new law of nature 
discovered by the patent applicant and reduced to practice, [he] think[s] 
that the novelty of the discovery should be enough to supply the 
necessary inventive concept.”128 The paired requirements of reduction to 
practice and narrowly tailored claims prevent undue preemption of the 
natural principle by limiting the patent to the specifically claimed 
application. If the patent-seeking diagnostic method is both reduced to 
practice and has claims that are narrowly tailored, those factors may rebut 
a presumption of unpatentability, especially if the third step also points to 
a finding of eligibility. 
The third step is an analysis of secondary considerations. Secondary 
considerations may be used in conjunction with step two to rebut a 
presumption of patent ineligibility. This step has less weight than step 
two, meaning that multiple factors must weigh in favor of patentability for 
the presumption to be rebutted. The main secondary considerations 
include the Transocean factors, namely, (1) whether the invention has 
been a commercial success, (2) whether there has been industry praise or 
if the results achieved by the invention were unexpected, (3) whether 
other companies have copied the invention, (4) whether before the 
success of the invention there had been skepticism in the industry with 
regard to the idea, (5) whether customers and competitors were willing to 
license the invention, and (6) whether the invention resolved a long-felt 
need in the industry.129 As explained in Section IV(B), these factors point 
toward a finding of eligibility because they demonstrate a very real need 
in the industry for the product that is being developed.130 
These considerations can rebut the presumption of patent ineligibility 
that occurs when a diagnostic test fails the Mayo Two-Step test. The test is 
particularly useful in regard to diagnostic methods that use an application 
of a newly discovered natural principle, as they are often rejected. Judge 
Dyk “worr[ies] that method claims that apply newly discovered natural 
laws and phenomena in somewhat conventional ways are screened out by 
 
127. NARD, supra note 105, at 264. 
128. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(Dyk, J., concurring). 
129. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 
F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
130. See supra Part IV.B. 
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the Mayo test.”131 Rather than disregard those contributions entirely, they 
should serve as a means to rebut the Mayo Two-Step. 
The novelty of the test comes from the three pieces added to the 
current Mayo Two-Step analysis: importing definitions from the 
jurisprudence surrounding §§ 102 and 103, the step of determining 
reduction to practice and sufficiently limited claim scope, and finally, the 
step of applying secondary considerations. The test improves the existing 
Mayo standard by adding the ability to rebut the initial finding of patent 
ineligibility using the narrowed language of the claim and actual reduction 
to practice. These additions are an improvement because they widen the 
scope of the test, allowing diagnostic tests that are an application of a 
newly discovered natural principle to be patent eligible, even if the steps 
applied to that principle are not themselves novel. The addition of the 
third step, allowing secondary considerations to be taken into account to 
rebut a presumption of unpatentability, hearkens back to the purpose of 
patent law itself. At its heart, patent law is about bringing innovative and 
new inventions to the public. Secondary considerations take into account 
the effect the invention has had on its given field. Factors such as whether 
the invention has been copied illustrate that there is a need in the field for 
the invention. An invention that is a needed improvement to its field is the 
exact feature that patent law seeks to reward. 
Some of the potential objections to the test have been addressed in 
Section V(B) above. Most notably, the limitations on patent eligibility of 
diagnostic tests were created through jurisprudence, and altering that 
jurisprudence is the path to most easily remedying them. 
D. Applying the Proposed Test to Ariosa 
Applying this Note’s proposed test to the technology at issue in 
Ariosa, it becomes evident that the determination of patent-eligibility as it 
regards the process of non-invasive fetal testing using cffDNA would be 
different than the Federal Circuit’s decision. 
First, we must apply the Mayo Two-Step test to the technology at 
issue. In the Federal Circuit’s 2015 Ariosa decision, the court first found 
that the claims at issue were based on a natural phenomenon.132 It then 
addressed the second step of the framework in order to determine if the 
use of the cffDNA described in the claims sufficiently transformed the 
natural principle of cffDNA into a patent-eligible method. The Federal 
Circuit held that the steps of cffDNA amplification and detection did not 
sufficiently transform the cffDNA to render the method patent eligible.133 
However, under the proposed test, one would import the language 
regarding transformation from § 102, which considers a new combination 
 
131. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 809 F.3d at 1289. 
132. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
133. See id. at 1376-77. 
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of steps previously known in the art to be an inventive step. The 
application of previously known steps such as amplification and detection 
to the newly discovered phenomenon of cffDNA would be a sufficient 
transformation of the natural principle for that method to become patent 
eligible because it is an application of known steps to a previously 
unknown phenomenon, thus creating a new combination. However, if the 
Courts found that the claims at issue in Ariosa still did not reach the level 
of patent eligibility after applying the Mayo test, the following two steps 
of the proposed test could rebut that finding of unpatentability. 
In order to determine whether the presumption of unpatentability 
could be rebutted, a court would have to determine whether the claims at 
issue were narrowly tailored and whether the invention itself had been 
reduced to practice. In Ariosa, the claims at issue were limited to a 
particular use of the cffDNA. Through amplification and detection, medical 
practitioners could use the cffDNA fragments as a non-invasive fetal 
diagnostic test. This is a narrow application of the natural phenomenon of 
cffDNA; it does not prevent cffDNA from being used in other applications 
unrelated to fetal testing or in fetal testing applications that do not use 
the steps of both amplification and detection. Furthermore, the testing 
method has been fully reduced to practice. Sequenom has already 
marketed its method under the name Maternit21, which demonstrates 
that it is a fully realized invention that works for its intended purpose.134 
The combination of the narrowly tailored claim and the reduction to 
practice demonstrates that Sequenom’s invention does not seek to 
preempt all other uses of the natural principle of cffDNA. These factors 
support a finding that the technology at issue should be patent eligible. 
Finally, if the above considerations were still found to be insufficient, 
secondary considerations should also be applied to the invention in 
Ariosa. This would allow a court to see whether there is a need in the 
medical field that outweighs a preliminary finding of patent ineligibility. 
With regard to commercial success and industry praise, the Maternit21 
test has wide market application and has seen high levels of success.135 
With regard to previous industry skepticism and unexpected results, prior 
to Sequenom’s discovery, medical practitioners regarded the maternal 
plasma or serum that contains the cffDNA as waste material and discarded 
it,136 implying that the material is worthless. Since the industry regarded 
the material as waste, the fact that Sequenom created a worthwhile and 
beneficial test from that waste material, one that solves a huge problem 
of high-risk prenatal tests, should be heralded as an unexpected result. 
In considering whether the invention addressed some long-felt need 
in the medical field, one must only look to the previous methods for fetal 
 
134. See Maternit21, supra note 89. 
135. See id. 
136. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 788 F.3d at 1373. 
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testing and the inherent risks in those procedures. Amniocentesis and 
chorionic-villus sampling carry risks as severe as miscarriage.137 A non-
invasive fetal test like Sequenom’s is an improvement over the prior tests 
and addresses the need for a safe and reliable method of fetal diagnostic 
testing. With regard to copying and licensing the invention, as shown by 
the infringement suit at issue in Ariosa v. Sequenom, companies such as 
Ariosa began producing tests identical to Sequenom’s as soon as 
Sequenom’s test hit the market. Overall, the analysis of the secondary 
considerations points favorably toward patent eligibility for Sequenom’s 
claims. 
Under the proposed test, it is likely that Sequenom’s claimed method 
for using cffDNA would be a patent-eligible use of a natural phenomenon. 
Conclusion 
In adopting of the Mayo Two-Step test, the Supreme Court sought to 
set forth a test for determining whether an invention or method that 
claims a use of a natural principle is patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
In particular, the Court sought to meaningfully limit the scope of patent 
eligibility to exclude those inventors who would wish to overstep their 
bounds, claiming patent rights on the laws of nature themselves or 
applications of those laws so broad as to be indistinguishable from the 
former. For these reasons, the test limited patent eligibility of natural 
principles to those inventions that contained additional steps that 
sufficiently transform the phenomenon into a limited and useful 
application. However, the Court did nothing to clarify the meaning of such 
terms as “sufficiently transform” or “inventive concept.” These terms are 
of particular importance in the field of diagnostic tests and are often the 
crucial factor between a determination of eligibility and a determination 
of non-eligibility. Requirements such as transformation are difficult to 
quantify, particularly in the medical field. For this reason, it is necessary to 
create a test that helps distinguish when a diagnostic test should be 
eligible for patent protection 
The proposed test clarifies these terms and facilitates the 
determination of eligibility. Furthermore, the test takes into account 
factors such as preemption, incentives for research, and benefit to the 
public. By adopting a test such as this one, courts would be taking steps to 
clarify which uses of natural principles are acceptable and which overstep 
their bounds into areas of undue preemption. Courts would be returning 
patent law to its roots in rewarding the creation of innovative 
technologies for the benefit of the public. 
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